Consider a body that can extrude its awareness and action into other bodies or bits of bodies in other places. An alternate operational entity that is spatially distributed but electronically connected. (Stelarc, 1999: 120) Of all the possible implications that first-wave cybernetics conveyed, perhaps none was more disturbing and potentially revolutionary than the idea that the boundaries of the human subject are constructed rather than given. Conceptualizing control, communication, and information as an integrated system, cybernetics radically changed how boundaries were conceived. (Hayles, 1999: 84) The Australian performance artist Stelarc's most recent work is raising interesting questions regarding the status of the body and the 'ownership' of its actions. Stelarc himself is very articulate about the techniques and conceptual basis of these performances, but a detailed examination of their context in philosophical debates is still needed. This article attempts such a contextualization through a discussion of Stelarc's performative experiments with the body-as-an-actionsystem in relation to the work of first-and second-wave cybernetics. Stelarc disrupts Cartesian notions of control and centricity in ways that accord closely with principles articulated by Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. A focus on Stelarc's work will allow me the additional scope to engage with the idea of performance as a form of 'hypothesis', an enacting of corporeal and conceptual possibilities in time and space.
Stelarc's more recent work has been with the body as an evolutionary structure, one that has become increasingly 'hollowed' by technological invasion, exemplified by medical technologies of prosthesis.
The effect of this work is a problematization of human/machine and interior/exterior dualisms. Attaching to his body an ever-increasing collection of high-technology components, Stelarc is displaced as autonomous agent and is reinscribed as the fleshy hub of a whirring cybernetic system. Just like the theatre directors Eugenio Barba and Jerzy Grotowski, who saw performance as an artistic mode suited to potentiality, who attempted to remake the body through forced defamiliarizations and re-articulations, Stelarc seems to intuit performance as the art of prospect in which the performer must be open to the continual corporeal decentrings that modified bodily existence requires. Both actor training and Stelarc's actions involve methods of inducing psychophysical malleability, the reduction of the performer to 'bits'.
Stelarc's investigations-through-performance, concerned as they are with 'corporeal decentrings', seem anathema to philosophical investigations which attempt to reduce the body and its actions to silence. In opposition to these models' tendencies to allow epistemological schemes to figure corporeality, some phenomenologists and cognitive scientists argue for the possibility that corporeal structures themselves have significant impact on the formation of concepts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Leder, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Varela et al., 1991) . In other words, Cartesianism, along with other philosophical schemas, might be seen in some ways as an axiomized reaction to structures of perception.
In The Absent Body, Drew Leder develops a phenomenological model of the self based on an ecstatic/recessive structure. He discusses the body's propensity gradually to fall from attention unless brought to consciousness through dysfunction or discomfort. Leder makes the suggestion that it is the corporeal recessions involved in the practices of conceptualization and concentration that provide the intuitive appeal of Descartes' disavowal of the body (1990: 103-48) .
In contrast to Descartes' epistemology, Stelarc's work is preoccupied with the possibilities of the body at the same time that it makes its boundaries, and hence its identity, ambiguous. His performances subject the logic of res cogitans and res extensa to subversion without inversion. To electro-chemically connect one's 'body' to a host of 'external' devices that both impinge upon and react to bodily and perceptual change suggests a logic outside that of either/or; perhaps thinking is extension.
Descartes wanted to exclude extension from the domain of the Real. As the 'owned' object of the thinking self, the body does not think; it is both epistemologically hazardous and ontologically distinct: I have never seen or perceived that human bodies think; all I have seen is that there are human beings, who possess both thought and a body. This happens as a result of a thinking thing being combined with a corporeal thing: I perceived this from the fact that when I examined a thinking thing on its own, I discovered nothing in it which belonged to a body, and similarly when I considered corporeal nature on its own I discovered no thought in it. (Descartes, 1988: 149) Stelarc's work resists the notion of thought as either interior or localized. A world away from the flat images and endless text found on-line that passes for 'knowledge' among some commentators, Stelarc's performances radicalize the idea of 'interactivity'; he is not merely 'appended' to devices, but ingests and implants them as components. Strangely, both Descartes and Stelarc have been at some point accused by critics of 'somatophobia': fear of the body. 1 Where Descartes apparently wanted to forget about it, Stelarc desires to move 'beyond' it. And yet it would be hard to argue that Descartes could have overly irrational fears about something which he believed could not violate his identity, could not prevent his thinking and could in no way affect his immortality. And again, could 'phobia' be consistently applied to a performance artist whose theoretical preoccupations and experimentation with his body could only be characterized as relentless?
Perhaps Descartes' progressive elimination of the sensual apparatus to achieve epistemological apodicity reveals not so much a somatophobia, but a kind of selfforgetting that ignores the materiality of both discourse and existence. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's essay 'The Cogito' in The Phenomenology of Perception, Leder argues that the material conspicuousness of the signifier tends to recede from thought to be replaced by a 'conceptual' signified. Through this recession, discourse is ignored as a structuring factor of that very thought. In an intuition that parallels Whorfian linguistics, Merleau-Ponty suggests that discourse not only structures thought, but disappears in that very act of structuration:
The wonderful thing about language is that it promotes its own oblivion: my eyes follow the lines on the paper, and from that moment I am caught up in their meaning, I lose sight of them. . . . Expression fades out before what is expressed, and this is why its mediating role may pass unnoticed, and why Descartes nowhere mentions it. Descartes, and a fortiori his reader, begin their meditation in what is already a universe of discourse. (cited in Leder, 1990: 103) Descartes' denial of the material status of thought has not only impacted upon metaphysics. The mind/body distinction was, by the 17th century, both an ontological division which asserted two primary kinds of 'things' of which the world was supposedly constituted, and the heuristic paradigm for the production of knowledges (Toulmin, 1990) . The mind/body split has not only supplied analytic epistemology with its orientation (that of representation), but with its seeming intractability -the problem of solipsism. How does one faithfully recover a world from which the immaterial knower is forever conceptually and ontologically estranged? How could mind and extension ever converse or interact? The Cartesian ego is radically devoid of an alter ego with which it might make contact.
While his work does not entertain a transcendent conception of cognition, a concern with 'mind' is not totally absent from Stelarc's work. His performances unsettle the 'object' status of mind by performatively refiguring it as a process; mind is an action, not a thing. Trying to explain the world of the sub-atomic particle, theoretical physicist David Bohm describes the habits of thought brought about by the predominance of subject-verb-object sentence structure, even when such a structure is manifestly inappropriate. He asks us to 'consider the sentence "It is raining." Where is the "It" that would, according to the sentence, be "the rainer doing the raining"?' (Bohm, 1980: 29) . Perhaps Stelarc's performances ask us to consider whether the assertion 'the mind is thinking' might be better rephrased as 'thought is happening'. While Stelarc's work utilizes highly advanced technologies, it may not ultimately valorize scientific reason any more than Cartesianism. As Erwin Strauss points out in his article 'Aesthesiology and Hallucinations', the pay-off for imbuing the senses and materiality in general with a stigma of incompetence over a protracted period, was the theological acceptability of a science predicated on mathematical physics. The soul's extradition from nature allowed natural science a theoretical autonomy that was previously unimaginable. With the Cartesian ego now occupying a place of immateriality, the body could be freely investigated as an object, using the techniques of newly emerging scientific disciplines. Like the development of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, the birth of modern epistemology required a transition from naive objectivism to transcendental subjectivism. For both thinkers -Descartes and the early Husserl -awareness of the ego was prior to awareness of any 'outside' world and wholly unmediated by materiality. 2 Epistemological dualism asserts that reality is arrived at by processes of judgement aimed at achieving correspondence between the internal processes of mind and the physical processes of the outside world; it is the epistemic symmetry noted earlier that allows one to posit 'identity' as a relation. 'Knowledge', configured within this matrix, seeks to link propositions to the objective world in a relation of identity. When cognition is conceived of as information taken in by the senses and processed by the soul, the role of perception is strictly delimited:
Seeing is no longer understood as the relation of an experiencing being to the world; it is rather an occurrence of sensory data in a worldless consciousness. In everyday life we see this wall as green, that table as brown. Descartes wants us to believe that originally such qualities of visible things are data in our mind. They will be related to an outside world by inference. . . . It is the 98 Ⅲ Body and Society Vol. 8 No. 3 manner of the reception of ideas which first makes known to us the existence of other things. From the effect we deduce its cause. (Strauss, 1958: 143) Physiological psychology subsequently took up this thesis that consciousness is alone with itself, and rephrased it in terms of 'stimulus and excitation, of excitation and conscious sign' (Strauss, 1958: 144) . Although, as their name implied, the physicalists attempted to explain mental processes solely in terms of physicalchemical process -a direct challenge to Descartes' mechanical-hydraulic theory -their theoretical modelling remained wholly within Cartesian coordinates. Even when attempting to rid psychology of mentalism, the 17th-century physicalists such as Johannes Müller, Julien de La Mettrie, Du Bois Reymond and Hermann Helmholtz all articulated their theorizations of perception in terms of aggregates of sensory data received by an 'inner' person.
Müller, who was perhaps the most influential of the above-named group, is credited with arguing for the specificity of the sensory nerve systems via a precise taxonomy of 'specific energies'. Müller's theory, however 'materialist' or 'scientific', couches perception in terms of stimulus and mentation:
The immediate objects of the perception of our senses are merely particular states induced in the nerves and felt as sensations either by the nerves themselves or by parts of the brain concerned with sensation. The nerves make known to the brain, by virtue of the changes produced in them by external causes, the changes of condition of external bodies. (cited in Rand, 1912: 543) The simultaneous commitment to ontological materialism and epistemological Cartesianism, on reflection, seems to have created a science always on the verge of self-refutation. The deterministic universe of classical physics and chemistry placed thought in a strange predicament: it was both immanent in the world and transcendent in analysis. How could mind, as itself an epiphenomenon of physical process, exert a will to choose the most rational explanation of the physical processes themselves? Hans Jonas asserts that all theory, even incorrect theory, is predicated upon the capacity for thought to 'rise above the power of extramental determinations. . . . Indeed, even the extreme materialist must exempt himself qua thinker, so that extreme materialism as a doctrine be possible ' (1981: 43) .
Divested of some of its arguably technofetishistic predilections, Stelarc's vision of non-localized intelligence, of agency extruded by interlocking systems of requisite complexity, comes very close to the systems theory approximation of mind suggested by anthropologist/evolutionary theorist Gregory Bateson in Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 'Mind is a necessary, an inevitable function of the appropriate complexity, wherever that complexity occurs. But that complexity occurs in a great many other places besides the inside of my head and yours' Performance as Guerrilla Ontology Ⅲ 99 (1972: 490) . One of the interesting results of such a conception of mind is not that it sheds light on artificial intelligence as a research program, but rather that it reframes the question as to whether intelligence can ever be said to be truly 'artificial'. Suggesting that a computer does not 'think' merely asserts, in this instance, that mind resists theorization as substance, but not as a system of relations. Bateson puts the matter this way:
Now let us consider for a moment the question of whether a computer thinks. I would state that it does not. What 'thinks' and engages in 'trial and error' is the man plus the computer plus the environment. And the lines between man, computer and environment are purely artificial, fictitious lines. They are lines across the pathways along which information or difference is transmitted. They are not boundaries of the thinking system. What thinks is the total system which engages in trial and error. . . . (1972: 491) Bateson's notion of 'mind', and systems theories in general, were highly critical of the subject-object distinctions that characterized analytic philosophies of mind. Although Artificial Intelligence was soon to develop heuristic models that reintroduced strong dualisms via a conception of mental process as symbol manipulation (involving the representation of an 'environment' to a 'subject' or machinic 'organism'), much of the earlier and more radical work eschewed such distinctions. For Erwin Laszlo, like Bateson, dualisms of this sort were highly arbitrary:
We must do away with the subject-object distinction in analyzing experience. This does not mean that we reject the concepts of organism and environment, as handed down to us by natural science. It only means that we conceive of experience as linking organism and environment in a continuous chain of events, from which we cannot, without arbitrariness, abstract an entity called organism and another called environment. (1973: 21) Bateson's theorizations are most profitably seen against the intellectual backdrop of the development of cybernetics, information theory and general systems theory, all of which he was heavily influenced by, and in turn, made significant contributions to. Central to the systems concept of mind is the privileging of immanence over transcendence: mental characteristics can be seen in any aggregate or 'ensemble of events' which possess sufficient complexity to respond to 'difference': to receive and transform information. For Bateson, information is defined as 'a difference which makes a difference ' (1972: 315) .
Etymologically, 'mind' has its origins in the notion of 'memory', and Bateson's model allows for this aspect of the mental to be illustrated. One example that he gives in both Steps to an Ecology of Mind, and Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, is the 'governor' of the steam engine. 3 The governor is a device that normally moderates the speed of an engine through regulating the supply of fuel. A preferred speed for the train is set, and in a way analogous to the operation of a thermostat, the governor continually monitors 'actuals' with 'ideals', supplying less fuel when the train is running too quickly, and more when it is running too slowly. The governor works on the principle of over-compensated correction for the prescribed deviation from course.
However, Bateson points out that the term 'governor' is a misnomer if it is understood to imply that it 'controls' the speed of the train in any unilateral way. Instead, he compares the governor to a 'sense organ', which transforms significant differences (information) into other significant differences. In this sense, the actual behaviour of the governor doesn't 'dictate', but, rather, is wholly determined by other parts of the system, and also its own behaviour at a previous time (Bateson, 1972: 316) . Hence, the governor exhibits mental characteristics, which include that of memory. Bateson's portrait of the governor is one of non-localized control:
. . . in no system which shows mental characteristics can any part have unilateral control over the whole. In other words, the mental characteristics of the system are immanent, not in some part, but in the system as a whole. (1972: 316) In this sense, some of Stelarc's performances might not best be seen as Stelarc's performances. Although these events converge around the spectacle of the performer's body, the very act of incorporating or becoming linked to pieces of 'machinery' suggests that the performance is that of a system. Stelarc's body does not serve to 'ground' these performances because their nature is to problematize the distinction between action and reaction: perhaps all one is left with is enaction. 4 Central to Bateson's notion of memory and non-localized control is the cybernetic idea of non-linear feedback loops. 5 The feedback loop was one of the central ideas of cybernetics. It describes a circular connection of causal components in which the information of a hypothetical or actual beginning is carried around each link on the loop until it eventually 'feeds back' to the point at which it started and then begins again. At this point, the information which has been fed back into the cycle has been altered, owing to the effects of the other links on the chain. The 'origin' then adds its own piece of information and the cycle continues.
In Ping Body, Stelarc wore the Third Hand, a custom-made robotic appendage that functions as an additional limb. Replete with the ability to grasp, release, rotate, and possessing tactile response, it responds to EMG (electromyogram) signals from the muscle tissue in Stelarc's thighs and abdomen. During Ping Body, the EMG controls in the vastus medialis and flexor muscles were partially given over to incoming instructions from willing participants on the Internet, all claiming a piece of agency in the performance experiment.
The electrodes which were used to stimulate muscle contraction and the EMG (electromyogram) controls in the vastus medialis and flexor muscles shouldn't be conceived as having 'controlled' Stelarc or even having been 'controlled' by Stelarc in any straightforward way. In performances like these, causation is wholly circular: the performance utilizes an elaborate feedback loop in which the dramatic focus is on the performer's body, the 'action' of which is derived from a number of sources. Any number of bodily organs/functions, non-organic machines and participants on the Internet are continually offering 'bits' of information which hope to assess 'deviation from course', and attempt 'correction'. 6 In Bateson's language, each link on the causal chain is an 'arc of a larger circuit':
. . . we may say that 'mind' is immanent in those circuits of the brain which are complete within the brain. Or that mind is immanent in circuits which are complete within the system, brain plus body. Or, finally, that mind is immanent in the larger system -man plus environment. In principle, if we desire to explain or understand the mental aspect of any biological event, we must take into account the system -that is, the network of closed circuits, we seek to explain the behaviour of a man or any other organism, this 'system' will usually not have the same limits as the 'self' -as this term is commonly (and variously) understood. (1972: 317) For Bateson, 'mind' must be wrenched away from its dogged attachment to the personal pronoun. Stelarc radicalizes the notion of prosthesis through performance and, by doing so, problematizes the notion of the strictly localized self. Prosthesis is not something added to the self or even used by the self, it is quite literally incorporated into it. As Jane Goodall notes, through the extension of neural networks, Stelarc 'explores the possibility of connectivity to a point where he can claim that the body linked up with electronic circuitry has ceased to function as a delimited entity ' (1999: 151 ).
Bateson's own example of 'prosthesis' (if it can be called that) is the blind man's walking stick. He asks: if the blind man owns and uses such a stick, where does his 'self' begin? At the tip of the stick which feels along the ground? At the end of the stick which is in the blind man's hand? Halfway? For Bateson, such questions are nonsensical, as the stick is simply a link in a chain along which information is transformed and transmitted: 'to draw a delimiting line across this pathway is to cut off a part of the systemic circuit which determines the blind man's locomotion ' (1972: 318) . The stick is nothing more than a very simple 'machine'.
Central to Bateson's arguments about mind is that epistemology -the way in which a system exchanges information and creates meaning through operating in its world -is wholly dependent on its material structure. Similar contentions have been made by the biologist Humberto Maturana and several of his colleagues at the University of Chile. All minds exhibit a specific ontology which gives rise to individual mental characteristics. Again, in a way analogous to both Bateson and Maturana, Stelarc's performative explorations of the 'post-human' imply degrees of epistemological modification achieved through structurally modified ontology:
. . . my focus is the body as a structure rather than as a psyche, or a site for inscription. . . . The body not as an object of desire but an object for designing. The body seen as an architectural structure where if you alter the architecture of the body, you adjust its awareness to the world. . . . So taking that a step further, if we alter our physiology, we alter our philosophy. (1995: 48) 7 For Maturana, ontological structure is read in purely biological terms: cognition is a 'biological phenomenon and can only be understood as such; any epistemological insight into the domain of knowledge requires this understanding' (Maturana and Varela, 1980: 7) . Although Maturana adopts a sort of biological essentialism with regard to the organization of cognitive architecture, he allows for degrees of structural plasticity as to how the material elements of mind can be configured. Like Stelarc, Maturana argues that evolution evinces potentially -and actually -profound degrees of this plasticity of cognitive arrangement (although what the two conceive of as legitimate instances of evolution may be widely divergent) (Maturana and Varela, 1980: 11-12) .
The Santiago Theory of Cognition (as Maturana's theory has subsequently come to be known) has been developed by his student Francisco Varela into a theory of cognition as enaction. As N. Katherine Hayles has noted, the difference between the Santiago theory and Varela's development might be seen primarily as one of emphasis: she suggests that the former is characterized by a more restrictive notion of recursivity, informational closure and a somewhat disembodied notion of information flow (Hayles, 1999: 154-7) . 8 In order to understand the radicalism of both the Santiago Theory of Cognition and the theory of cognition as enaction, one must contrast them with the early notion in cognitive science which held that cognition was essentially the manipulation of symbols ('cognitivism'). The very early years of cybernetics attempted to establish a science of mind predicated on the idea of it as a logical device that was amenable to analysis in terms of digital configuration. Simply put, this view entails the identification of the mind with the brain, the brain with the neurological/biological notion of the 'firing of synapses', and the endowment of the firing of synapses with purely digital characteristics (that is, they either fire or don't fire: a binary option implying either 1 or 0). These premises supplied a research programme that was to provide some very fruitful -instrumentalfindings. Arguably, the digital computer was a direct result of this era of cybernetic/systems research.
From the mid-1950s, cognition was increasingly seen as the rule-based (and Performance as Guerrilla Ontology Ⅲ 103 largely algorithmic) manipulation of symbolic representations of an 'outside world'. Thus, hypothetically, 'thought' could function through any device able to handle such rules and such symbols. Hayles refers to this tendency in cognitive science, which decorporealizes information, as 'the erasure of embodiment' (Hayles, 1999: xi) . From these few hypotheses in early cybernetics came what was to be known as the 'Strong AI program': the fervent search not for an answer as to whether this conception of cognition was correct, but rather for the elusive 'device' that would be able to operationalize the presuppositions at a high level of cognitive efficiency. Needless to say, as a research paradigm that attempted to emulate the functional mental features of a human being, the strong AI programme has all but failed. 9 Subsequently, Humberto Maturana and his colleague, Francisco Varela, came up with an alternative conception of cognition. For many years, the only seeming alternative to a conception of cognition based on representation or 'realism' was a form of absolute constructivism or idealism. That is, the debate about cognition forced an overly restrictive choice: a notion of cognition conceived as the ability to retrieve and manipulate symbols which derive from the 'outside world', or a conception of cognition as merely the internal result of the brain's architecture, unaffected by any external world. Varela's notion of enaction questions the conceptual validity of both of these options and charts a way between realism and solipsism.
Although Stelarc's radical modifications of physiological architecture seem sometimes to provoke high degrees of cultural anxiety, they seem not to alter the basic characteristic of Varela's notion of cognition as enaction. In The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Varela et al., 1991) , Varela and his colleagues discuss a model of cognition that favours neither of the aforementioned options. A discussion of the human organism's capacity to register colours provides a lucid model of cognition as enaction. Colour is generally assumed to be an inherent property of the wavelength of the reflected light received by the retina of the human eye. Instead, colour has been found to be significantly independent of any designation of 'wavelength'; what arrives to the human being as the colour 'red' is the result of a complex state of neurological assemblages, a global neural state which is arrived at through processes of evolutionary modification. Having said this, there are still a number of constraints on this structural configuration: for instance, an object possesses a certain capacity to reflect light in comparison to other objects; the object could also be said to 'stop' at a certain point before another object begins. However, although these constraints are a necessary condition of perceiving colour, they are by no means a sufficient condition. 10 Taking a similar view of perception as a form of enaction, Stelarc explains that, 'the laser eyes stimulate vision as an active transmitter and a generator of images rather than as a passive receptor of light' (Stelarc, 1995: 49) .
Performance's relationship to ontology reveals neither a world that lies totally 'out there', waiting to be retrieved by accurate representation, nor a world wholly 'in here', a world of our own making which has no bearing to an external reality. Varela chooses to define cognition as a capacity to 'bring forth a world'. Unlike Descartes, who starts with an epistemology that defines knowledge as certainty and then winds up with an ontology to reflect this (the structure of ontological dualism), or like eliminative materialism, that starts with a reified ontology and then winds up with an epistemology to reflect this (the structure of physicalist monism which does away with 'folk psychology'), Bateson, Maturana, Varela and Stelarc all suggest that epistemology and ontology forever co-define each other in a kind of dynamic circularity. 11 We are now in a position to see how Stelarc's actions literalize performance's propensity to change the physical and perceptual state of its performers. Although much commentary has been devoted to the possible effects that the theatrical performance has on its audience, far less has been concerned with the effects of actor training and performance on the performers themselves. And yet, figures such as Meyerhold, Stanislavski and Grotowski all suggested that actor training is a process which requires the initiate to develop increasing degrees of structural plasticity. Such training is able to dramatically shift the relationship between the subject and its environment. Through his 'method of physical action', Stanislavski taught that certain corporeal configurations -physical postures -could produce profound changes in the dynamics of perceptual and emotional state. A seeming reversal of his previous reliance on 'emotion memory', the method of physical action suggested that the 'life of the human body in a role is no small matter . . . the bond between body and soul is indivisible. The life of one gives life to the other' (Stanislavski, 1963: 144) . 12 One might wish to contest the analogies between physical theatre training and Stelarc's radical interventions into corporeal integrity; surely they are worlds apart? And yet, as Stelarc himself often points out, very small shifts in physiological status or anatomical structure have had drastic effects on evolutionary history. It could be argued that the anatomical and physiological similarities which bind the hominid to the chimpanzee in evolutionary history, make trivial their respective differences. And yet these differences are present. They are also crucial:
By slight modifications of musculature of the lower back and upper thighs, it was possible for hominids to have bipedal locomotion, and bipedal locomotion is probably the most significant event in our human history. Apparently the explosive growth of the cortex occurs after Performance as Guerrilla Ontology Ⅲ 105 bipedalism. All of a sudden two limbs become manipulators, producing artifacts and instruments, and the whole relationship with the world changed. These minor anatomical changes produced a radical new orientation in the world. (Stelarc, 1995: 46) If N. Katherine Hayles is correct in noting that the discovery of the constructed boundaries around the human subject has been the most potentially disturbing of all of the implications of cybernetics, then Stelarc's work seems to draw that disruption in starker relief. While some cyberneticists were able to model their approaches on to a three-dimensional space, none considered that their own bodies were the most appropriate laboratories for their hypotheses.
In From Ritual to Theatre (1982) , anthropologist Victor Turner provides a useful characterization of performance which he relates to notions of the 'subjunctive'. Drawing on the work of van Gennep, Turner posits that performance necessarily invokes a register of communication concerned with possibility and hypothesis; the subjunctive operates with a logic of ' "if it were so," not "it is so" ' (1982: 83 ).
Stelarc's work would seem to stand as a kind of performative research, as a mode of speculative ontology which doesn't hope to represent possibility but to enact possibilities in real time and space. And yet, if Stelarc's actions exacerbate certain kinds of cultural anxieties, then perhaps it is privileged construals of subjectivity that need closer examination, not the performances themselves.
Only if one thinks of the subject as an autonomous self independent of the environment is one likely to experience the panic performed by Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics and Bernard Wolfe's Limbo. This view of the self authorizes the fear that if the boundaries are breached at all, there will be nothing to stop the self's complete dissolution. By contrast, when the human is seen as part of a distributed system, the full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to depend on the splice rather than being imperiled by it. (Hayles, 1999: 290) 
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